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Introduction
Campaign spending is an important aspect of electoral competition. 1 Recent years have seen a change of paradigm with the introduction of new technologies that allow for largescale micro-targeting of campaign activities: candidates increasingly target their campaign effort towards individual voters with individualized messages instead of addressing the whole electorate, or even large groups of voters. 2 This paper presents a formal analysis that examines the implications that this change of paradigm will have on electoral competition in a modern democracy.
We consider persuasive campaign competition in majoritarian elections with two candidates and a continuum of, ex-ante homogenous, voters and compare that with a proportional, or vote-share maximizing, system in which each party's representation in a legislature is proportional to the share of votes received by that party. We assume that candidates (or parties) may anonymously target campaign spending at individual voters by employing a (general, non-decreasing) distribution of costly campaign spending. Each voter observes each candidate's voter-specific campaign effort provided to them and, then, votes for the candidate that provides them with the higher level of persuasive campaign effort.
In this setting, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and find that the problem of constructing a best-response can be decomposed into two distinct components: a budget choice problem and a budget allocation problem. Our model of campaign competition in which targeted spending is a sunk cost, provides a non-constant-sum extension of Myerson's (1993) constant-sum model of political competition. In the standard zero-sum formulation of the game, the majoritarian and vote-share maximizing objective games share the same unique equilibrium which features micro-targeting, i.e., candidates have an incentive to "cultivate favored minorities": some voters are the subject of much campaign effort, others receive very little. In our model with endogenous campaign spending, the equilibria arising in the games under each of the two objectives qualitatively differ. We find that the discontinuity in the definition of winning in a majoritarian system creates an incentive for candidates to increase the level of uncertainty in the way that they allocate campaign spending.
Because in a majoritarian system each politician's payoff has a sharp discontinuity at 50% of the votes, candidates have incentive to target the smallest possible majorities. However, as noted by Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , supermajorities are frequently observed in majoritarian systems. 3 We find that in the unique simultaneous-move equilibrium supermajorities arise with certainty. Because the unique equilibrium features non-degenerate mixed strategies, supermajorities arise from the uncoordinated choices with regards to the sizes of the budgets chosen by the candidates, and unequal budgets translate into unequal vote shares. Hence, the analysis offers a new explanation for the emergence of supermajorities as an electoral outcome in majoritarian systems.
Our analysis can also be extended to deal with the case that each voter's evaluation of a candidate may depend upon the combination of the candidate's targeted campaign spending and the candidate's identity. We introduce this possibility in our framework by allowing voters to either be of the loyal, or partisan, type -in which case they are loyal to a single candidate and vote for that candidate regardless of the candidates' targeted campaigning -or of the swing type -in which case the voter votes for the candidate that targets them with the higher level of campaign effort, regardless of that candidate's identity. We consider the case of coarse information in which candidates know the aggregate share of loyal voters but do not know whether any specific voter is a loyal voter or a swing voter, and of perfect information in which candidates know each individual voter's type. In comparing the possible combinations of an electoral system, majoritarian or proportional, and an information level, coarse or perfect, we find that, holding constant the electoral system, the level of information has no effect on the equilibrium expected expenditures. Because the majoritarian system generates a larger discouragement effect for the disadvantaged candidate, equilibrium expected expenditures are higher in the proportional system than in the majoritarian system, and, as a result, the advantaged candidate has a higher equilibrium expected payoff in a majoritarian system than in a proportional system, regardless of the information structure.
We proceed as follows. The next section reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the formal framework. Section 4 solves for the Nash equilibrium. Section 5 extends our model to examine the role of private information and loyalty in political campaigns. The last section contains concluding remarks. We relegate all proofs to the Appendix. 3 Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013) discuss the importance of this discontinuity for electoral competition in majoritarian systems and compare it with proportional systems.
Related literature
Within the literatures on electoral competition and multi-dimensional strategic resource allocation, our paper is most closely related to three specific strands of the literature:
(i) models of redistributive politics that feature a variation of the Colonel Blotto game,
(ii) models of campaign spending that feature the all-pay auction (henceforth APA), and (iii) non-constant-sum versions of the Colonel Blotto/General Lotto games and multidimensional APAs. First, our contribution is related to the literature that models redistributive politics as a variation of the Colonel Blotto game 4 known as the General Lotto game. 5 A seminal contribution in this literature is Myerson (1993) , in which candidates simultaneously choose binding promises of how they will allocate an exogenous budget across a homogeneous electorate in the event that they win the election. Candidates may target individual voters by employing an (anonymous) distribution of transfer offers. 6 Each voter makes an independent draw from each candidate's effort distribution and votes for the candidate that makes the higher offer to that voter. The expected transfer from each candidate's offer distribution satisfies the budget in expectation, and the exogenous budget is the amount of tax revenue or surplus that can be distributed among the voters after the election. Myerson's and our problem have in common that each candidate wins if he attracts a majority of a continuum of voters. In his framework a voter casts his vote for the candidate who promises him a higher payment. In our framework voters cast their vote for the candidate who allocates a higher persuasive effort to that voter during the campaign.
Our formulation features campaign expenditures that are paid for by the candidates, whereas in the Myerson framework the binding campaign promises of the winning candidate are taken from an exogenous government budget. Thus, the point of departure in our framework is that the candidates endogenously choose, and pay, their overall expenditures, and this budget choice and the choice of how to allocate the budget are made simultaneously. 7 Note, however, that in our model the campaign spending targeted to 4 For early contributions to this literature see Gross and Wagner (1950) and Shubik (1970 Myerson (1993) has spurred a large literature on redistributive politics, including Ueda (1998) and Lizzeri (1999) that both deal with endogenous budget choice. Ueda (1998) allows candidates to choose not only the cumulative distribution of promises, but also the amount that they can take from the economy and use for making promises. This is equivalent to giving politicians the possibility of choosing their budget, but requires that the voters (rather than the politicians or parties) pay for the cost of the budget chosen by the winning candidate. He shows that Myerson's arguments on the incentives to produce favored minorities are not directly generalizable to this model.
In our model, contrary to Ueda (1998), the budget choice has an all-pay nature:
campaign expenditures entail an explicit cost that directly lowers candidates' payoffs.
These expenditures have to be paid for whether the candidate is elected or not, and the budgets are not generated through taxation of voters. Lizzeri (1999) extends Myerson's (1993) setup to a two-period model of "divide-the-dollar" electoral competition. In Lizzeri (1999) the budget is endogenous because politicians may increase the first-period resources available for redistributive transfers by running public debt. 8 As a main result, Lizzeri (1999) shows that candidates will always raise the maximal debt, because it allows them to better target the pool of resources to voters.
Second, the endogenous choice of campaign spending in an electoral contest with persuasive efforts has been carefully studied for the case in which voters cannot be treated individually. 9 This approach focuses on the choice of the total amount of spending, and on how the equilibrium choice of spending depends on issues such as legal spending limits or asymmetries between the candidates. From a structural point of view many of the analyses can then be interpreted as variants of the canonical models of all-pay contests, such as Tullock (1980) contest, or the all-pay auction without noise as considered by Hillman and Riley (1989) campaign spending to ex ante symmetric voters. We find that they do, and that this leads to electoral outcomes that are systematically characterized by unequal treatment and, in majoritarian systems, by supermajorities. In contrast to Snyder (1996, 2000) and Banks (2000) who address the problem of supermajorities in majoritarian systems in models with sequential choices by two asymmetric candidates, we find that supermajorities will also arise for ex-ante symmetric candidates and simultaneous campaigning choices.
One interpretation of our set-up is that we consider an all-pay auction without noise between two contestants for an infinite number of identical objects, and where each contestant's objective is to win at least 50% of the objects. A variant of this problem with a finite number of objects has been studied by Rosenthal (2003a, 2003b ).
12
They examine majority auction games, which are simultaneous sealed-bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a majority (or possibly a supermajority) of the objects. In the all-pay majority auction case, their setup is a finite battlefield version of our game. A key insight from Rosenthal (2003a, 2003b) is the use of mixtures whose supports are surfaces of tetrahedra and whose best-response sets are the tetrahedra themselves. However, except in the pure chopstick case, 13 they have no equilibrium constructions when only two candidates compete. Our contribution is to derive the Nash equilibrium with two candidates in an environment with a continuum 10 This relationship is also examined in Sahuguet and Persico (2006) and Kovenock and Roberson (2008) . 11 For more on the issue of caps in this environment, see Amir (2015) . 12 See also Ewerhart (2016) who provides a new "fractal" solution to the chopsticks auction. 13 This game consists of two players who compete in three simultaneous all-pay auctions for three identical objects. Each auction assigns one object. Owning one single object yields a benefit of zero.
Owning two or three of the objects yields a benefit of 2.
of objects.
Our analysis is also related to generalized or non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto and draw from player i's effort distribution G i , where G i (x) denotes the probability that an arbitrary voter receives persuasive effort less than x from player i. Let S denote player i's set of pure strategies, i.e. the set of univariate distribution functions with nonnegative support and finite mean. Let Σ denote the set of probability distributions over S.
16
For each player i, a mixed strategy in this game is a probability distribution function In the event of a tie we assume that the voter uses fair randomization. 17 Thus, player i's vote share given that player i uses the pure strategy G i for the random variable X i and
. 16 Note that a random function, or stochastic process, is a special case of a random element. Additionally, because Σ is a separable complete metric space, every probability distribution on Σ is tight. For further details, see Parthasarathy (1967) and Kallenberg (1997) . 17 As is common in the literature on contests featuring the all-pay auction contest-success function, this assumption is not critical for our results which hold for a range of tie-breaking rules, and ties do not arise in equilibrium.
In the vote-share maximizing game, player i's payoff is given by
In the majoritarian objective game, player i wins if
, and loses otherwise. Let w i (G i , G −i ) denote if player i wins, given that player i uses the pure strategy G i and player −i uses G −i , where
Player i's payoff in the majoritarian game is given by
We define the majoritarian game with endogenous budgets as the two-player, simultaneousmove, one-shot game in which each player i ∈ {A, B} chooses, possibly randomizing according to a mixed-strategy σ i , an effort distribution G i and each player i's payoff is
The vote-share maximizing game with endogenous budgets is the two-player, simultaneousmove, one-shot game in which each player i ∈ {A, B} chooses, possibly randomizing according to a mixed-strategy σ i , distribution G i of persuasive effort and each player i's
Equilibrium characterization
We begin with the characterization of equilibrium, in what turns out to be the simpler case, of the vote-share maximizing game with endogenous budgets. Next, we characterize equilibrium in the majoritarian game with endogenous budgets. Then, this section concludes with a comparison of the equilibria arising under these two objectives. Before stating our main results, it is useful to introduce some additional notation to help describe a mixed strategy in this game.
of pure strategies in the support of σ i that have the same expected cost b. Then, define
as player i's budget distribution function, which is defined as the probability that the random effort distribution G i drawn from the mixed strategy σ i has a mean
that is less than or equal to b. A key distinction between the equilibria arising under the two objectives is that in the unique equilibrium of the vote-share maximizing game,
, is degenerate, whereas in any equilibrium of the majoritarian objective game, each player i's budget distribution, F i (b), is non-degenerate.
Vote-Share Maximizing Game
Recall that in the vote-share maximizing game each player i's payoff is given by equation
(1). In the unique Nash equilibrium (σ * A , σ * B ) of the vote-share maximizing game with endogenous budgets, each player i's budget distribution, F * i (b), is degenerate with all mass placed on b = 1 /2 and each player i's effort distribution is G *
As noted in Hart (2016) , 18 the vote-share maximizing game in which each player's payoff function is given by equation (1) -that is, each player maximizes his vote-share and both players pay their expected effort -is strategically equivalent to a symmetric two-player all-pay auction with complete information, in which each player has a payoff of 1 from winning the auction. Thus, equilibrium is characterized by 19 Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) . In the unique pure-strategy Nash
of the vote-share maximizing game with endogenous budgets, each
For intuition on this result, assume for a moment that the set of voters is finite with n identical voters. 20 Vote-share maximization then means that candidates attribute the same fixed value to winning the vote of each of these voters, and this value is independent of how many of the other votes they win. This implies that the game may be interpreted as a contest between two players who compete for n identical prizes in n identical and independent all-pay auctions. Suppose that a value of 1/n is attributed to winning any single of these votes. We know from Baye et al. (1996) that the unique equilibrium in each of the n parallel all-pay auctions is in mixed strategies with G *
This has implications for the equilibrium vote share and for the players' equilibrium persuasive campaign efforts. For each player, the sum of the average efforts across the n all-pay auctions is
. Similarly, for each player, the sum of the expected winnings across the n all-pay auctions, which corresponds to the sum of the expected votes won by the player, is
For the case of a continuum of voters, we follow the convention of the redistributive politics literature originating with Myerson (1993) in which it is assumed that each player chooses a one-dimensional effort distribution, possibly according to a mixed strategy. In the context of targetable, persuasive campaign effort, the effort that a player allocates to any given voter is an independent draw from that player's effort distribution. As noted in Myerson (1993) , and emphasized in Hart (2008 Hart ( , 2016 , this continuum voter convention may be interpreted as competition over a single, representative, voter but where each player pays their expected effort. That is, let n = 1 in the example given above with n identical voters and have each player pay their expected bid rather than the bid drawn from their distribution of bids. Because the costs of bids are linear and each player is risk-neutral, it follows directly that the payoff function given in equation (1) 
Majoritarian Game: Main Results
Theorem 2 completely characterizes the properties of the equilibrium budget distribution For intuition on why any pair of mixed strategies (σ A , σ B ) that satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2 forms an equilibrium, suppose that player −i is using a mixed strategy σ −i that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2. Player i's expected payoff from any pure
To calculate E σ −i w i (G i , G * −i ) , it is useful to first establish a fact, formally stated below, that provides insight into the problem of calculating a best-response when your opponent is using a strategy that satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2. In the statement of Fact 1, we restrict our focus to any arbitrary effort distribution
player i wins a majority of the votes against almost every G * 
Fact 1 is a fairly straightforward consequence of player −i using a strategy σ * −i that satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2, but it is useful to provide a sketch of the argument. 
. We therefore know that for any pure strategy G i player i's vote share 21 satisfies the following property
where G i (x) is weakly increasing because it is a cumulative distribution function. It follows from equation (4) 
21 Because G * −i (x|b) does not place strictly positive mass on any point x ∈ [0, 2b], P r X i = X −i |G i , G * −i (x|b) = 0. That is, ties in persuasive effort arise with probability zero. 22 In the case that P r[
Clearly, there exists such ab, and it follows that
. We now show that the pointb satisfiesb ≤ E G i (x). By way of contradiction suppose thatb >
it follows thatb
Next, recall that
Then, inserting equation (7) into equation (9), it follows that
Because 1−
< 0 for all x > 2b, it follows from equation (11) 
] is strictly less than 1 /2, which is a contradiction to the definition ofb in equation (5) . It, therefore, follows thatb ≤ E G i (x).
We now utilize Fact 1 to examine player i's problem of calculating a best-response when player −i is using a strategy σ * −i that satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2. Combining Fact 1 with equation (3) player i's expected payoff from any pure strategy G i is given by
whereb is defined in equation (5) . Note that because F *
, player i's maximum payoff from any pure strategy G i is 0. Next, it follows from equation (10), together with the definition ofb in equation (5)
and player i's expected payoff, see equation (12), is 0. To summarize, if player −i is using a strategy σ * −i that satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2, then any effort distribution G i with finite mean
provides player i with his maximal expected payoff of zero. Because the Theorem 2
any strategy σ i satisfying the conditions in Theorem 2 is a best response for player i.
One important insight that follows from Fact 1 is that in the majoritarian game with endogenous budgets the problem of constructing a best-response to an equilibrium strategy, characterized in Theorem 2, can be decomposed into two distinct components: a budget choice problem and a budget allocation problem.
To illustrate this point, consider first the following game which eliminates the budget choice problem and focuses solely on the budget allocation problem. We define the majoritarian game with incomplete information regarding the players' exogenous use-itor-lose-it budgets as the two-player simultaneous-move game in which each player i's use-it-or-lose-it budget b i is private information and assumed to be drawn according to a common distribution function F -satisfying Supp(F ) = [0, 1], F (0) = 0, and with strictly positive and continuously differentiable probability density function f -each player chooses an effort distribution G i with mean E G i (x) ≤ b i , and each player i's payoff is w i (G i , G −i ). The equilibrium of this version of the majoritarian game is provided in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 There exists a unique pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the majoritarian game with incomplete information regarding the players' exogenous use-it-orlose-it budgets in which for each
From Fact 1, we know that if player i's budget type is b i , then the maximum payoff that player i can achieve -given that player −i is using a family of distributions that satisfies
Furthermore, a family of distributions that satisfies the conditions in Corollary 1 is a best-response for player i that achieves this maximum payoff. Thus, the proof that a combination of strategies (G * A (x|b), G * B (x|b)) satisfying the conditions in Corollary 1 forms an equilibrium follows directly from Fact 1. Given the common distribution F of each player's private level of use-it-or-lose-it resources, the proof of uniqueness can be directly constructed from the Theorem 2 proof of uniqueness in the Appendix (see .
Returning to the problem of constructing a best-response to an equilibrium strategy in the majoritarian game with endogenous budgets and given Corollary 1's characterization of equilibrium in the budget allocation component of the best-response problem, we now examine the budget choice component. Given that each player is using a family of effort distributions that satisfy the conditions in Theorem 2, player i wins against player −i whenever player i's budget exceeds that of −i by an arbitrarily small but positive ε.
Moreover, player i's expected payoff from any budget level b i ∈ [0, 1] is, from equation 
Comparison of Equilibria Across Electoral Systems
Theorems 1 and 2 have a number of interesting implications. First, they reveal that in the equilibrium of both the vote-share maximizing and majoritarian games the two candidates fully dissipate, in expectation, the rent from winning office. That is, under each objective, each of the players chooses a budget that is, on average, equal to 1 /2 the value of the prize of winning office, and each of them wins with probability 1 /2. In the statement of Proposition 1, it will be convenient to use β i to denote player i's vote
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium (σ *
A , σ * B ) of the majoritarian game, the probability of the winner's vote share, denoted β A and β B , being greater than or equal toβ ∈ ( 1 /2, 1) is
From Theorem 2's characterization of equilibrium, it, intuitively, follows that the uncoordinated mixed-strategies of A and B yield unequal budgets, and these translate into unequal vote shares.
Our result offers a new solution to the puzzle described by Snyder (1996, 2000) and Banks (2000) , but for the case of simultaneous budget choices by the two candidates. Groseclose and Snyder offer a possible solution that relies on the assumption that the two candidates move sequentially, i.e., for a situation in which the challenger commits to his own expenditure level after the incumbent chooses his expenditure level.
Our results provide a new answer to this question.
Loyalty, micro-targeting, and private information
Now we examine the case that each voter's evaluation of a candidate may depend upon the combination of the transfer from the candidate and the candidate's identity. We introduce this possibility in our framework by allowing voters to either be of the loyal, or partisan, type -in which case they are loyal to a single candidate and vote for that candidate regardless of the candidates' persuasive efforts -or of the swing, or independent, type -in which case the voter votes for the candidate that provides him with the higher persuasive effort, regardless of that candidate's identity. For simplicity, we assume that each voter is either loyal to candidate A, or a swing voter. 23 Loyalty for party A is independently and identically distributed across voters and each voter is a loyal voter for party A with probability ∆ ∈ [0, 1 2 ). 24 The targetability of persuasive campaign effort depends upon the level of information available to candidates regarding voters' types, or characteristics. We examine this issue at two points on the spectrum of available information: coarse information and perfect information. 23 For simplicity, we consider the case in which only candidate A has loyal voters. But the analysis can be extended, with some notational effort, to allow both candidates to have strictly positive shares of loyal voters. 24 If ∆ ≥ 1 2 the problem degenerates and becomes uninteresting. The pivotal voter would be loyal in this case, and any vote-buying effort would be fully wasted. Vote buying and budget choices would be inconsequential for the majority game.
Coarse information of voter loyalty
With coarse information, candidates know the aggregate share ∆ of loyal voters, but whether a specific voter is a loyal voter or a swing voter is unobservable to each of the candidates. Thus, each candidate i chooses, possibly randomizing according to a mixed strategy σ i , an effort distribution G i and each voter (loyal or swing) makes an independent draw from G i . Given the presence of voter partisanship, let w P A (G A , G B ) denote if player A wins a majority of the votes, given that player A uses the pure strategy G A and player B uses G B , where
. Player i's payoff in the majoritarian game with endogenous budgets, partisan voters, and coarse information is given by
The following proposition shows how the combination of partisanship that generates an advantage for candidate A and coarse information regarding this advantage translates into equilibrium vote-buying budgets and distributions of payments.
Proposition 2 In any Nash equilibrium (σ *
A , σ * B ) of the majoritarian game with endogenous budgets, partisan voters, and coarse information player A's budget distribution is
and player A's family of effort distributions is, for almost every
Similarly, player B's budget distribution is
and player B's family of effort distributions is, for almost every
Expected campaign budgets are the same for the two candidates and given by
Expected payoffs in equilibrium are
There are different ways in which having loyal voters may be advantageous: it could increase A's equilibrium winning probability, it could reduce the amount of campaign spending that is needed by candidate A to win, or it could affect both the winning probability and the persuasive campaign expenditure. Proposition 2 shows that, with coarse information, the advantaged candidate benefits in terms of winning probability. Candidate A wins with a higher probability, but both candidates choose the same expected budget size. This equilibrium outcome is characterized by candidates with a stronger electoral base winning more often, and with a campaign budget that does not necessarily exceed the campaign budget of the underdog candidate. Note also that the presence of a loyalty advantage for player A makes the electoral competition less competitive, and, thus, both players spend less than in the symmetric game without partisanship. The key step in modifying Corollary 1 to allow for voter loyalty is extending Fact 1 to allow for voter loyalty, which we denote as Fact 2.
Fact 2 If player A uses a strategy σ *
A that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 2 and player B uses any effort distribution G B with E G B (x) ≤ 1, then there exists a budget
. Similarly, if player B uses a strategy σ * B that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 2 and player A uses any effort distribution G A with E G A (x) ≤ (1−2∆) /(1−∆), then there exists a budget level
The single-crossing portion of Fact 2 follows along the same lines as for Fact 1. Beginning with player B and his pointb B at which crossing occurs, defineb B aŝ
To show thatb B ≤ (1−2∆)E G B (x) /(1−∆), by way of contradiction suppose that
Then, because
it follows from equations (22) and (23) that
Then, inserting equation (24) into the second line of equation (25), it follows that
, it follows from equation (26) that
] is strictly less than 1 /2, which is a contradiction to the definition ofb B in equation (21) . Thus, it follows thatb B ≤ (1−2∆)E G B (x) /(1−∆). (14) player B's expected payoff from any pure strategy G B is given by
Combining equation (21) with equation
In addition, for any effort distribution G B with finite mean E G B (x) ≤ 1 − ∆ and
and player B's expected payoff, from equation (27), is
which is equal to 0 because F * Result 1 (Konrad, 2002 ) For a prize value of V and γ ≤ 1 the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is characterized as follows,
and (29) and player B's payoff is given by
From equations (29) and (30) and Theorem 2, it, again, follows from lines drawn by Hart (2016) , that this game is strategically equivalent to a symmetric two-player all-pay auction with complete information in which each player has a value of 1 − ∆ for winning the auction. The consideration of a finite set of n voters is instructive again. If a share of ∆ of them are loyal, the sum of independent prizes consists of the remaining 1 − ∆ voters.
As opposed to the discouragement effect arising in the majoritarian objective game, the presence of a loyalty advantage for player A lowers the players' valuations of the swing voter segment (as there are fewer). ) campaign spending is higher under voteshare maximizing competition than under majoritarian.
Perfect information of voter loyalty
We, now, examine the case of perfect information in which both candidates are able to perfectly identify voters by type, and, thereby, partition loyal voters and swing voters into two identifiable segments of voters. Candidates choose segment-specific distributions of persuasive effort, denoted G A mixed strategy in this game is a bivariate probability distribution σ i ∈ Σ 2 over the set of pure strategies S for loyal voters and the set of pure strategies S for swing voters, where σ k i ∈ Σ, k ∈ {I, L}, denotes the marginal distribution function of σ i that specifies player i's randomization over the set of pure strategies S for 
The key difference in moving from coarse to perfect information, as can been in seen comparing equations (14) and (31), is that with perfect information the players have the ability to more efficiently target their campaign spending, thereby lowering the effective cost of campaign spending. 25 Note that that to calculate the expected cost the means must be weighted by the mass of the voter segment that they are targeted to, as in equation (31) .
Proposition 3 In any Nash equilibrium (σ *
A , σ * B ) of the majoritarian game with endogenous budgets, partisan voters, and perfect information each player i's effort distribution for the loyal voters G L * i (x) is degenerate with all mass placed at 0. Player A's budget distribution is
and player A's family of offer distributions for the swing voter segment is, for almost
and player B's family of offer distributions for the swing voter segment is, for almost
The proof of Proposition 3 relies on the same forces as the proof of Proposition 2.
For the budget distribution component of the problem, note that perfect information's increased targeting efficiency/lower effective costs of voter-specific campaign spending in equation (31) are equivalent to lowering the costs of campaign spending from 1 to 1 − ∆. Furthermore, the equilibrium budget distributions, F * A and F * B , in Proposition 2 correspond to the unique equilibrium of an unfair all-pay auction in which each player has a value of V = 1 /(1−∆) for winning the object 26 and player A has an effectiveness advantage of γ = (1−2∆) /(1−∆). Because nothing has changed in the effort distribution component of the problem, Fact 2 applies with the caveat that
Finally, consider the case of a partisan electorate and vote-share maximizing competition with perfect information. Player A's payoff is given by (38) and player B's payoff is given by
. (39) From equations (38) and (39) and Theorem 2, it, again, follows from lines drawn by Hart (2016) , that this game is strategically equivalent to a symmetric two-player all-pay auction with complete information in which each player has a value of 1 for winning the auction. Here again, we see that the presence of a loyalty advantage for player A lowers the players' valuations of the swing voter segment which has decreased in size from a measure of 1 to a measure of 1 − ∆. 
Comparison of Equilibria Across Electoral Systems and Information Levels
The following table provides the equilibrium expected expenditures and payoffs for each of the four possible combinations of an electoral system, majoritarian or proportional, and an information level, coarse or perfect. The last column, from the left, in Table 1 provides the equilibrium expected expenditures and payoffs for both the majoritarian and proportional systems when there is no voter loyalty (∆ = 0). From Table 1 , we see that holding constant the electoral system, the level of information has no effect on the equilibrium expected budget. Equilibrium expected expenditures are higher in the proportional system than in the majoritarian system. The advantaged player's, A's, equilibrium expected payoffs are ranked from highest to lowest as follows:
majoritarian with perfect information, majoritarian with coarse information, and then the two proportional systems. This follows from the fact that the majoritarian system generates a larger discouragement effect for the disadvantaged player, B and that with perfect information the advantaged candidate is able to more efficiently exploit his voter loyalty advantage.
The level-playing field effect -i.e. equilibrium expenditures increase as the playing field becomes more level and the contest becomes more competitive -is common in allpay contests. For example, in the unfair all-pay auction examined above the equilibrium expenditures are γV /2 which are increasing as the size of player A's effectiveness of bids advantage decreases, i.e. γ → 1. 27 Intuitively, the vote-share maximizing game's lack of a discontinuity (at a majority of voters) in the benefit part of each player's payoff function is less discouraging for the disadvantaged player, B. Thus, A's loyalty advantage has less of a discouragement effect under vote-share maximizing competition.
Switching from coarse to perfect information about loyalty allows candidates to target their persuasive efforts to only the swing voters. If the loyalty status of a voter can be observed by the candidates, only swing voters are targeted with effort in equilibrium, and the expected attention given to each swing voter is higher with perfect information. 28 In terms of the potential role of campaign finance reforms and regulation of information gathering by political parties, one implication of privacy of information about loyalty is that it makes campaign spending more inclusive in the sense that all voters can expect to get positive attention from the two candidates without affecting the expected total 27 See also Che and Gale (1998) Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , and, when parties are equally effective in targeting resources across voter segments, Dixit and Londregan (1996) . See also the more closely related literature in which voters may be perfectly sorted into segments by their level of attachment to a party and the parties may target resources to each identifiable segment, such as Roberson (2008, 2009 ). For a recent survey of empirical work that exmines these, and related, issues in (re)distributive politics, see Golden and Min (2013) .
budget or winning probabilities. 29 
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we characterized Nash equilibrium in a game that is of increasing practical importance: simultaneous persuasive campaigning in majoritarian electoral systems with voter-specific campaign spending. We focused on campaign expenditures that target voters and are of an all-pay nature: expenditures are made prior to the election and cannot be recovered by a candidate, whether or not he wins. The candidates compete in either a majoritarian election or a proportional election and simultaneously choose how much to spend and how to allocate their expenditure among the voters. We also allow for a partisan electorate with a segment of "loyal" voters who vote for a particular candidate regardless of the voter-specific campaign spending that they receive, and compare the outcomes across regimes with either the majoritarian or proportional objectives and with either coarse or perfect information. We characterize equilibrium in a model that combines aspects of both problems, and elements of the solutions of each of these two frameworks show up in our equilibrium. We find that homogenous voters receive different amounts of attention in the equilibrium. We also find that the equilibrium budget distributions coincide with the equilibrium distributions of bids in the standard all-pay auction, and full dissipation of rents occurs in the case of symmetric candidates. A further finding is that supermajorities are likely to occur under majority rule but not in a proportional system. This provides a new hypothesis for this phenomenon.
consists of two parts. First, we establish that in all equilibria each player i has the same unique budget distribution, denoted by F i (b). This portion of the proof consists of Lemmas 1-7. Next, we show that in all equilibria each player i has a unique effort distribution G i (x|b) for each budget level b ∈ Supp(F i ). This portion of the proof consists of Lemmas 8-13.
Beginning with Lemmas 1 and 2, Lemma 1 establishes that each player i's mixed strategy σ i satisfies the property that if there exists a pair
then it must almost surely 30 be the case that 
Lemma 1, which implies that all effort distributions with the same expenditure win the contest with the same probability, follows directly from the fact that in equilibrium no player i has a payoff increasing deviation. Let b i and b i denote the upper and lower bounds, respectively of the support of player i's budget distribution (F i ).
Let w i (G i , G −i ) be defined as follows
Lemma 2 establishes that if (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is an equilibrium, then it must be the case that for almost
, where -in the absence of a tie occurring at E G i (x) with a strictly positive probability -
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium (σ A , σ B ), it must almost surely be the case that for G i ∈ Supp(σ i ),
Proof There are two parts of the proof. First, we show that for
The combination of these two parts yields the desired result.
Beginning with part 1 and by way of contradiction, suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which for a player i and a set G i ⊂ Supp(σ i ) occurring with strictly positive probability under σ i it is the case that
deviation for player i is to hold F i (b), and thus expected costs, constant, but at each G i ∈ G i to deviate to the effort distribution
30 Because the support of a distribution function is the complement of the union of all open sets of S with σ i -volume 0, it is possible that there may exist points G i ∈ Supp(σ i ) where G i yields less than the equilibrium payoffs. However, such points must occur with probability zero. This is clearly a payoff increasing deviation, which creates a contradiction to the assumption that there exists an equilibrium in which for a player i and a set G i ⊂ Supp(σ i ) occurring with strictly positive probability it is the case that
This concludes the proof of part 1.
Moving on to part 2 and by way of contradiction, suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which for a player i and a set G i ⊂ Supp(σ i ) occurring with strictly positive probability under σ i it is the case that
Combining this with the assumption that
Noting that (40) may be written as
Because part 1 implies that
equation (41) yields a contradiction to the assumption that there exists an equilibrium in which for a player i and a set G i ⊂ Supp(σ i ) occurring with strictly positive probability it is the case
It follows from part 1 -for
surely -that it must almost surely be the case that for
This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.
It follows from Lemma 2 that if (σ A , σ B ) is an equilibrium, then player i's expected payoff from any pure strategy G i ∈ Supp(σ i ) with expected cost E G i (x) may be written as
Note that in the absence of a tie occurring with a strictly positive probability in the equilibrium
The proofs of Lemmas 3-6 follow from equation (42) We begin with Lemma 8 which establishes that all equilibria are interchangeable with the equilibrium stated in Theorem 2. Let E σ i (x) denote the expected cost of the mixed strategy σ i , and note that in any equilibrium strategy σ i , it follows from equation (42) and Lemma 7 that
Proof Because (σ A , σ B ) and (σ * A , σ * B ) are both equilibria we know that in each equilibrium neither player has a payoff increasing deviation. Hence, we have the four following inequalities:
Recall that from Lemma 7 any equilibrium strategy σ i necessarily has the unique equilibrium distribution of expected costs,
Then, taking the sum of equations (43) to (46), we have 0 ≥ 0 which implies that (43)- (46) all hold with equality. But, if (43)-(46) all hold with equality, then this implies that σ A and σ * B are best-responses to each other, and that σ * A and σ B are best-responses to each other. Thus, the two equilibria (σ A , σ B ) and (σ * A , σ * B ) are interchangeable. In Lemma 9 we show that if (σ A , σ B ) is an equilibrium, then from Lemma 8's result on the interchangeability of equilibria, we can use the fact that σ * B is a best-response to σ A to provide a necessary condition that holds for almost every effort distribution in any equilibrium parametric family of effort distributions.
Note that because each effort distribution G i (x|b) is monotonic, each G i (x|b) is differentiable almost everywhere, where g i (x|b) denotes the derivative of G i (x|b). Note also that because 
Proof of Proposition 1
We use the equilibrium strategy (σ * i , σ * −i ) from Theorem 2 to calculate the share of voters who vote for i. 
Proof of Proposition 2
We now extend the Theorem 2 characterization of equilibrium to the majoritarian game with endogenous budgets, partisan voters, and coarse information. As this proof follows along the same lines as Theorem 2, we only provide an outline of the changes in the proof of Theorem 2. First, recall that w P A (G A , G B ) denotes if player A wins a majority of the votes, given that player A uses the pure strategy G A and player B uses G B , where 
Proof of Proposition 3
First, both politicians focus their expenditures only on the swing voters. The reason is that the loyal voters vote for politician A regardless of the campaign expenditures: any dollar spent on a loyal voter will be wasted since it has a budgetary cost without increasing the probability of winning votes for any politician. This implies that only swing voters are targeted with strictly positive expenditures.
The proof of equilibrium distributions and their implication for expected budgets, and expected payoffs follows the same steps as the proof of Proposition 2. The reasoning, however, applies to the share 1 − ∆ of swing voters. This share is deterministic and candidates know the identity of the swing voters.
